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Reinsurance, ruin and solvency issues: some pitfalls
Arthur Charpentier1
Abstract
In this paper, we consider optimal reinsurance from an insurer's point of view. Given a (low) ruin
probability target, insurers want to ﬁnd the optimal risk transfer mechanism, i.e. either a proportional
or a nonproportional reinsurance treaty. Since it is usually admitted that reinsurance should lower ruin
probabilities, it should be easy to derive an eﬃcient Monte Carlo algorithm to link ruin probability
and reinsurance parameter. Unfortunately, if it is possible for proportional reinsurance, this is no
longer the case in nonproportional reinsurance. Some examples where reinsurance might increase ruin
probabilities are given at the end, when claim arrival and claim size are not independent.
Keywords: Dependence; Reinsurance; Ruin probability; Solvency requirements
1 Introduction and motivation
Reinsurance can be deﬁned as the transfer of risk from a direct insurer, the cedant, to a second insurance
carrier, the reinsurer. Basically, if an individual risk is too big for insurance company, or if the potential
loss of the entire portfolio is too heavy, the insurance company can buy a reinsurance protection.
There should be links between reinsurance and ruin probabilities. For instance, (15) focuses on the
impact that risk transfer instruments, such as reinsurance and catastrophe bonds, have on the perfor-
mance of insurers. [...] A typical insurance company's goal is to operate under two somewhat conﬂicting
constraints: a safety ﬁrst constraint and a return on assets constraint. The ﬁrst relates to both a target
ruin probability level and a target insolvency level; the second is to satisfy the ﬁrm's shareholders and
investors. Assume that an insurer sets a target ruin probability (over a given time horizon) - based on
its risk appetite - but if the ﬁrm cannot meet this level of insolvency risk (with a given strategy), then it
must take steps to reduce the amount of risk in its portfolio and a natural technique considered in (15) is
to purchase reinsurance.
Some details can be found in recent literature. As mentioned in (12), reinsurance plays an important
role in reducing the risk in an insurance portfolio. (21) claimed that if we choose ruin probability as a
risk measure, the goal of reinsurance is to reduce this probability to a certain chosen level. And ﬁnally, (9)
is even more speciﬁc about risk reduction: reinsurance is able to oﬀer additional underwriting capacity
for cedants, but also to reduce the probability of a direct insurer's ruin .
In this paper, we will discuss the later, showing that this statement is a standard pitfall and that
reinsurance can actually increase ruin probability, which should lead risk managers or regulators to be
more cautious about reinsurance plans of (re)insurance companies.
Hence, we formulate the solvency problem as follows: given a ruin probability target and a capital
amount u, could it be possible to design a reinsurance treaty (either proportional or nonproportional)
with optimal parameter θ? ? An more precisely, is there a simple relationship between ruin probability,
economic capital u and reinsurance ? In Section 2, classical results on that problem will brieﬂy be
recalled, mainly based not on ruin probability, but on bounds for ruin probability. Then in Sections 3
and 4, proportional and nonproportional reinsurance treaties will be consided. As we will see, in the
proportional case, reinsurance always lower ruin probabilities and a simple Monte Carlo algorithm can
be designed. Unfortunately, this will not be the case for nonproportional reinsurance since reinsurance
can actually increase ruin probability. Simple examples will hep to understand how this counterintuitive
result can be obtained.
2 The standard mathematical framework
A reinsurance treaty, is an `equitable' transfer of the risk of a risk, from one entity (the insurance company,
also called ceding company) to another (the reinsurance company), in exchange for a fee called premium.
The reinsurance company repays a function of the paid loss.
• Proportional reinsurance: Quota-Share
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arthur.charpentier@univ-rennes1.fr. This work has been partially supported ﬁnancial support from the AXA Chair on
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The quota-share treaty is a treaty between the ceding company and the reinsurer to share premiums
(paid by insured to the insurance company) and losses (claimed by the insured) with the same proportion,
i.e. for some (ﬁxed) α ∈ (0, 1]{
claim loss X: αX paid by the cedant, (1− α)X paid by the reinsurer,
premium P : αP kept by the cedant, (1− α)P transfered to the reinsurer.
• Nonproportional reinsurance: Excess-fo-Loss
The excess-of-loss treaty is a treaty which only responds if the loss suﬀered by the insurer exceeds a
certain amount, `retention' (upper limit), `priority' or `deductible' (denoted d).
{
claim loss X: min{X, d} paid by the cedant, max{0, X − d} paid by the reinsurer,
premium P : Pd kept by the cedant (the net premium), P − Pd transfered to the reinsurer.
We consider here the classical Cramér-Lundberg framework (see e.g. (4), (11) or (2)), i.e. assume that
A1 claims arrival is driven by an homogeneous Poisson process, Nt ∼ P(λt), so that durations between
consecutive arrivals Ti+1 − Ti are independent E(λ) random variables,
A2 claim size X1, · · · , Xn, · · · are i.i.d. non-negative random variables,
A3 claim size is independent of the claim arrival process.
If the Xi's have ﬁnite exponential moments, claims are said to have light tails, while if the Xi's do not
have ﬁnite exponential moments, claims have heavy tails. And ﬁnally let Yt =
Nt∑
i=1
Xi denote the aggregate
amount of claims during period [0, t].
The pure premium for a given period of time (usually one year) is the expected value of the aggregate
loss. Hence, the pure premium required over period [0, t] is
pit = E(Yt) = E(Nt)E(X) = λE(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
t.
Note that more general premiums can be considered, e.g.
• safety loading proportional to the pure premium, pit = [1 + λ] · E(Yt),
• safety loading proportional to the variance, pit = E(Yt) + λ · V ar(Yt),
• safety loading proportional to the standard deviation, pit = E(Yt) + λ ·
√
V ar(Yt),
• entropic premium (exponential expected utility) pit = 1
α
log
(
E(eαYt)
)
,
• Esscher premium pit = E(X · e
αYt)
E(eαYt)
,
• Wang distorted premium pit =
∫ ∞
0
Φ
(
Φ−1 (P(Yt > x)) + λ
)
dx,
In this paper, as in the classical Cramér-Lundberg model, assume that
A4 premium pit is a linear function, i.e. pit = pit where pi is the premium per unit of time (say one year).
The general expression is that pit = ϕ(Yt). Among standard assumptions on the premium principle,
recall the following,
A5 the premium is homogeneous (of order 1), i.e. ϕ(λX) = λϕ(X), for all λ > 0.
A6 there is a safety loading, i.e. ϕ(X) ≥ E(X).
The classical solvency problem is the following: given a ruin probability target, e.g. 0.1%, ﬁnd capital
u such that,
ψ(T, u) = 1− P(u+ pit ≥ Yt,∀t ∈ [0, T ]) = 1− P(St ≥ 0,∀t ∈ [0, T ]) = P(inf{St, t ∈ [0, T ]} < 0) = 0.1%,
where St = u+ pit− Yt denotes the insurance company surplus. After reinsurance, the net surplus is then
S
(θ)
t = u+ pi
(θ)t−
Nt∑
i=1
X
(θ)
i ,
where pi(θ) is the net premium, and{
X
(θ)
i = θXi, θ ∈ [0, 1], for quota share treaties, denoted α afterward
X
(θ)
i = min{θ,Xi}, θ > 0, for excess-of-loss treaties, denoted d afterward.
In practice, ruin probability is usually a target imposed by the shareholders, regulatory administrations,
or the market (and competitors). In obtain to obtain a AAA ranking from ranking agencies (namely
Moodys, Standard & Poor's or Fitch IBCA ), or a AA ranking (quality borrowers, a bit higher risk than
AAA), the default (or ruin) probability should be lower than 0.03% over one year (or from 0.02% to 0.06%
over 5 years). Hence, we are dealing with extremely rare events. Instead of targeting a ruin probability
level, (6) and Chapter 9 in (8) suggest to target an upper bound of the ruin probability. In the case of light
tailed claims, it is possible to obtain an upper bound for ruin probability: let γ denote the `adjustment
coeﬃcient', deﬁned as the unique positive root of
λ+ piγ = λMX(γ), where MX(t) = E(exp(tX)).
The Lundberg inequality (see Section 7.6 in (8)) states that
0 ≤ ψ(T, u) ≤ ψ(∞, u) ≤ exp[−γu].
(10) proposed an improvement in the case of ﬁnite horizon (T <∞). (6) studied the impact of reinsurance
treaties on those two upper bounds in the case of exponential claims.
Instead of upper bounds, it is also possible to consider approximations of ruin probability. (3) and
(22) proposed some approximations in the case where E(|X|3) < ∞. But those approximation are valid
only when u → ∞. Finally, using some Gaussian approximation (14) proved that the cedant's non-
ruin probability decreases with the deductible. But in this paper the goal is to focus on the exact ruin
probability level (instead of an upper bound).
3 Proportional reinsurance
With proportional reinsurance, if 1− α is the ceding ratio, the surplus process for the company is
S
(α)
t = u+ piαt−
Nt∑
i=1
αXi (1)
with α ∈ [0, 1]. Without further assumptions (such as A1, A2 or A3), we can prove that reinsurance can
always lower ruin probability.
Proposition 3.1. In the most general model with an homogeneous premium principle (A4), consider a
proportional reinsurance treaty with quota share α, then ruin probability is decreasing with α.
Proof. From equation 1, if the premium principle is homogeneous, then piα = αpi, and therefore
ψ(u, T, α) = P(∃t ∈ [0, T ], S(α)t < 0) = P(∃t ∈ [0, T ], (1− α)u+ αSt < 0)
≤ P(∃t ∈ [0, T ], αSt < 0) = ψ(u, T ).
Assuming that there was ruin (without reinsurance) before time T , if the insurance had ceded a
proportion 1− α∗ of its business, where
α∗ =
u
u− inf{St, t ∈ [0, T ]} ,
there would have been no ruin (at least on the period [0, T ]). If ψ(T, u, α) denote the ruin probability
associated to reinsurance cover α, then
ψ(T, u, α) = ψ(T, u) · P(α∗ ≤ α|ruin).
From a numerical point of view, one need to estimate ruin probability without reinsurance, and the
distribution of α∗ given that there was a ruin at time τ ∈ [0, T ]. More generally, if
α∗ =
u
u−min{St, t ∈ [0, T ]}1(min{St, t ∈ [0, T ]} < 0) + 1(min{St, t ∈ [0, T ]} ≥ 0),
ψ(T, u, α) = ψ(T, u) · P(α∗ ≤ α).
The optimal (ex-post) reinsurance program can be visualized on Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Proportional reinsurance helps to decrease ruin probability, the plain line is the gross surplus,
and the dotted line the cedant surplus with a reinsurance treaty.
In that case, the algorithm to plot the ruin probability as a function of the reinsurance share is simply
the following
RUIN <- 0; ALPHA <- NA
for(i in 1:Nb.Simul){
T <- rexp(N,lambda); T <- T[cumsum(T)<1]; n <- length(T)
X <- r.claims(n); S <- u+premium*cumsum(T)-cumsum(X)
if(min(S)<0) { RUIN <- RUIN +1
ALPHA <- c(ALPHA,u/(u-min(S))) }
}
rate <- seq(0,1,by=.01); proportion <- rep(NA,length(rate))
for(i in 1:length(rate)){
proportion[i]=sum(ALPHA<rate[i])/length(ALPHA)
}
plot(rate,proportion*RUIN/Nb.Simul)
The relationship between ruin probability and the cedant's share can be visualized on Figure 2. Since
proportional reinsurance can only lower ruin probability, it is natural to observe an increasing function.
Further, ruin probability is null when the cedant share is 0 (all the risk is transfered, and the initial
capital is still u). On that numerical example, if the cedant company want to have a ruin probability
half lower than the one without any reinsurance treaty, the insurance company should keep 1/3 of the
risk when claims are Pareto distributed with tail index close to 1 (extremely heavy tails) and 4/5 of the
risk when claims are Pareto distributed with tail index equal to 3 (lighter tails). Again, those proportions
are coherent with intuition: with heavy tailed claims, proportional reinsurance does not reduced ruin
probability very eﬃciently.
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Figure 2: Ruin probability as a function of the cedant's share, for diﬀerent tails for claim size.
4 Nonproportional reinsurance
With nonproportional reinsurance, if d ≥ 0 is the priority of the reinsurance contract, the surplus process
for the company is
S
(d)
t = u+ pi
(d)t−
Nt∑
i=1
min{Xi, d} where pi(d) = E(S(d)1 ) = E(N1) · E(min{Xi, d}).
Here the problem is that it is possible to have a lot of small claims (smaller than d), and to have ruin
with the reinsurance cover (since p(d) < p and min{Xi, d} = Xi for all i if claims are no very large), while
there was no ruin without the reinsurance cover (see Figure 3).
In the two following section, we will show that it is possible to increase ruin probability with reinsurance,
in the case of a nonhomogneous Poisson process, and dependent claim size.
4.1 Nonhomogeneous Poisson process and dependent claim size
Nonhomogeneous Poisson processes have been considered in the context of ruin probability calculation
e.g. in (18) or (13). Hence, a ﬁrst possible extension is a two assume diﬀerent periods, with diﬀerent λt.
For instance, we consider a two periods, and a Poisson process with intensity λ1 on the ﬁrst period
(say [0, T/2)) and λ2 on the second period (say [T/2, T ]). It is also possible to assume that claim size
have distribution F1 on period 1 and F2 on period 2.
Remark 4.1. This model can be interesting e.g. when dealing with hurricanes. The `hurricane season' is
from May till October, and during this period, the intensity is much higher (see (20)). This can be used
also for car insurance, since there are usually more claims in winter than in summer.
Dependence between claim sizes and claim arrivals has been motivated in (1) for instance. It can be
introduced easily based on conditional independence: given the period of arrival, the claim size distribution
is either F1 or F2, or more precisely here Fθ1 and Fθ2 (where the two distributions are in the same
parametric family, where we assume, for convenience that θ denotes the expected value).
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Figure 3: Case where nonproportional reinsurance can cause ruin, the plain line is the gross surplus, and
the dotted line the cedant surplus with a reinsurance treaty.
The case (λ1 > λ2) and (θ1 > θ2) corresponds to{
period 1: a lot of large claims
period 2: a small number of small claims
while the case (λ1 > λ2) and (θ1 < θ2) corresponds to{
period 1: a lot of small claims
period 2: a small number of large claims
A path generations of the later case can be visualized on Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4: Nonhonomgenous Poisson process, and claim size dependent on claim arrival process.
Consider the following case
A1' claims arrival is driven by an nonhomogeneous Poisson process, with two periods, 1 and 2, and
parameters λ1 = 1.5λ and λ2 = 0.5λ respectively, with λ = 20,
A2' claim size are bounded distributions, either uniform or Beta, with distributions F1 during period
1 and F2 during period 2, where F1 is the uniform distribution over [0, 4/3] and F2 is the uniform
distribution over [0, 4].
A3' claim size is dependent of the claim arrival process (dependence by mixture)
For convenience, assume that the premium is here the pure premium2. For the numerical application on
Figure 4.1, we assume that u represent 15% of the yearly (gross) premium.
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Figure 5: Nonhonomgenous Poisson process, and bounded claim size (uniform on top and beta below),
dependent on claim arrival process.
On this example, we see clearly that increasing the deductible from 1 to 2 is very risky, since the net
premium decreases more than the net losses, which increases ruin probability. Note that this result have
been obtained with small changes in the values of the Poisson process or the distribution of the claim size
(but still being bounded). Hence, when losses and arrivals are correlated, reinsurance can increase ruin
probability and lower the solvency of the insurance company.
2Since claim arrival and size are not independent, we cannot use the standard formula stating that the pure premium is
the product of frequency and the average cost. Here the pure premium is λ.
4.2 Heterogeneous Poisson process and dependent claim size
A second extension is obtained when the claims arrival process is an heterogeneous Poisson process, and
a mixture for claim size. Consider an heterogeneity variable Θ. Given Θ, we consider a classical Carmér-
Lundberg model, with intensity λθ for the Poisson process, and distribution size Fθ.
Remark 4.2. Still in the context of hurricanes or large storms, (17) mention that `Doubly periodic non-
homogeneous Poisson models' can be considered: the short term periodicity is the seasonal eﬀect mentioned
in the previous section, but we can also consider a long term periodicity, leading to years with a lot of
hurricanes, and years with no hurricanes.
Consider the following case
A1 claims arrival is driven by an heterogeneous Poisson process, i.e. λ1 = 1.5λ and λ2 = 0.875λ, with
λ = 20, with probabilities 20% and 80% respectively, when Θ is either equal to 1 or 2,
A2 claim size are bounded distributions, either uniform or Beta, with distributions F1 when Θ equals
1 and F2 when Θ equals 2, where F1 is the uniform distribution over [0, 7/2] and F2 is the uniform
distribution over [0, 13/8].
A3 claim size is dependent of the claim arrival process (dependence by mixture)
For convenience, assume that the premium is here the pure premium. For the numerical application on
Figure 4.2, we assume that u represent 15% of the yearly (gross) premium.
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Figure 6: Heterogeneous Poisson process, and bounded claim size (uniform), dependent on claim arrival
process.
Similarly here, heterogeneity and dependence can lead to the nonintuitive case where reinsurance leads
to a more risky portfolio.
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